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Abstract
This paper examines the changing use of policy levers in the English post-compulsory education 
and training system, often referred to as the Learning and Skills  Sector.   Policy steering by 
governments has increased significantly in recent years, bringing with it the development of new 
forms of arms-length regulation.  In the English context these changes were expressed during 
the 1980s and 1990s through neo-liberal New Public Management and, since 1997, have been 
extended through the New Labour government’s project to further ‘modernise’ public services. 
We look here at the changing use of policy levers (focussing in particular on the role of targets, 
funding,  inspection,  planning  and  initiatives)  over  three  historical  phases,  paying  particular 
attention to developments since the formation of the Learning and Skills Council (LSC) in 2001. 
We conclude by considering the range of responses adopted by education professionals in this 
era of ‘modernisation’.
‘Modernisation’ and the role of policy levers in the Learning and Skills Sector
Introduction: the rise of policy steering
‘Policy steering’ of lifelong learning is not confined to the UK and is part of a much wider 
international debate about the role of national  governments in education and training 
policy (Green 1999).  This paper attempts to add to this literature on ‘policy steering’ 
through  an  examination  of  the  way  that  the  UK  government  has  used  different 
configurations of policy levers in the English post-compulsory sector since the 1990s, 
with a particular focus on funding, targets, planning, inspection and policy initiatives.  It is 
one of a series of papers from the ESRC Teaching and Learning Research Programme 
project on ‘The impact of policy on learning and inclusion in the new Learning and Skills 
Sector  (LSS)’,1  which  aims  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  national  policy  steering 
mechanisms on teaching, learning and assessment in the LSS.2  
Any analysis of the role and impact of policy levers in the LSS needs to be seen within  
the  context  of  changing  forms  of  governance  and  the  rise  of  policy  steering.   The 
concept of policy steering refers to the processes whereby national governments have 
withdrawn  from  direct  control  over  the  administration  of  public  services  and  have 
increasingly used a range of different levers to steer policy.   Policy steering became 
increasingly  widespread  as  the  administrative  Keynesian  state  declined  and  was 
replaced by new forms of governance based upon neo-liberal principles (Ainley, 2004; 
Newman, 2000).
The rise of policy steering may be seen as a response to the displacement of the old 
certainties  of  twentieth  century  industrial  society  by  a  more ‘reflexive  modernisation’ 
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(Beck,  1994) in  which there is  a growing awareness of  the limitations of  the state’s 
capacity to solve complex social problems on its own.  Newman (2001) argues that the 
involvement of a wider range of ‘stakeholders’ in public service delivery is necessary for 
tackling social and policy problems, leading to increased policy steering.  The rise of 
policy steering has also been politically driven, underpinning neo-liberal approaches to 
public service reform (New Public Management) and, subsequently, the UK New Labour 
government’s agenda of public service modernisation.       
New Public Management and modernisation
During  the  1980s  and  early  1990s  public  services  and  the  relationship  between 
government  and  citizens  in  the  UK  were  transformed  by  New Public  Management. 
Primacy was given to economic norms and values in the public services (Christiansen 
and Lægreid, 2002).  Public management was reformed through:  ‘restructuring of the 
public sector, particularly through privatisation; restructuring and slimming down central  
civil  services;  introducing  competition,  especially  through  internal  markets  and 
contracting public services to the private sector;  [and] improving efficiency, especially  
through performance auditing and measurement’ (Minogue, 1998:18).  Thus,  ‘citizens  
and clients were recast as consumers, and public service organisations were recast in  
the image of the business world’ (Newman, 2005:45).
Since 1997 the New Labour government has developed a new model of governance 
based  upon  a  discourse  of  modernisation  (Newman,  2005).   In  important  respects 
modernisation continued the New Public Management project of transforming the public 
sector through the use of market mechanisms and the promotion of a consumer ethos, 
attacking monopoly forms of provision and increasing accountability to service users and 
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other  ‘stakeholders’.   There was  also  continuity  in  the  ‘focus  on the containment  of  
welfare expenditure, on organisational efficiency and performance, and on the search for  
business solutions to social and policy problems’  (Newman, 2005:46).  Modernisation 
was  presented  as  a  rational  process  of  improving  public  management,  ‘of  updating 
services to match the expectations of modern consumers … and to meet the business  
requirements of the ‘modern’ world’ (ibid.).
What makes modernisation distinct from New Public Management is that it is linked to 
social  democratic  attempts  to  construct  a  ‘third  way’  in  politics  (Giddens,  1998). 
Modernisation seeks to deliver a more diverse set of policy outcomes using arms-length 
agencies and a more comprehensive set of policy levers.  As the operational functions of 
government have increasingly been ‘contracted out’ to various Non-Departmental Public 
Bodies and public-private partnerships (Ainley, 2004; Steinberg and Johnson, 2004), so 
its role has shifted to that of ‘a regulator of services, setter of standards and guarantor of  
quality’ (Newman,  2001:83).   Policy  levers,  such as performance targets,  standards, 
audit,  inspection,  quality  assurance processes and powers to intervene where public 
services  are  ‘failing’,  have  consequently  become central  instruments  in  a  system of 
arms-length regulation.  
The role of policy levers
We use the term policy levers to refer to the ‘governing instruments’ (Kooiman, 2003) 
which  the  state  has  at  its  disposal  to  direct,  manage  and  shape  change  in  public 
services.   ‘Policy  levers’  thus  serves  as  shorthand  for  the  wide  array  of  functional 
mechanisms through which government and its agencies seek to implement policies. 
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However, they are not neutral tools: the choices about which policy levers to use and 
how  they  are  used  are  inherently  political  and  not  simply  rational  administrative 
responses to pre-existing policy problems.  The political character of policy levers means 
that they can become ends in themselves.  A classic example of this is government 
targets.         
It is important to distinguish between policy levers and the policy drivers that define the 
goals of policy (Shires, 2003).  Policy drivers, whether expressed through official policy 
documents, ministerial exhortation or statements of government priorities in the mass 
media,  may  be  taken  as  cues  to  action  by  those  who  manage  and  deliver  public 
services.  As well as providing the framework within which policy levers are constructed 
and implemented, policy drivers can prompt direct responses ‘on the ground’ (which may 
however constitute ‘misreadings’ of the intentions of policy-makers).                       
Informing our approach to policy levers is Ball’s concept of the ‘policy trajectory’ (Ball, 
1993, 1994).  This goes beyond the ‘stages’ model of public policy (John, 1998) to a 
more  encompassing  view  of  interactions  over  time  and  at  different  system  levels. 
Interactions around the implementation of policy levers can be conceptualised in at least 
four ways.  
• Firstly, there are interactions at different levels of the governance system.  This is 
particularly  important  where  multiple  decisions  about  the  operation  of  policy 
levers are made through a range of arms-length agencies at different strategic 
levels (e.g. national, regional and local).  Some of the main dynamics of these 
relationships between different organisations within the LSS were explored in our 
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first  papers on the new learning  and skills  landscape  (Hodgson  et  al.,  2005; 
Coffield et al., 2005).  
• Secondly, there are interactions at the level of ‘local ecologies’.  The concept of 
local  ecologies  refers  to  local  conditions  within  which  education  and  training 
provision  takes  shape  and  is  delivered,  encompassing  historical  patterns  of 
educational  provision,  local  competitive  or  planning  environments,  differing 
configurations of institutional provision, economic conditions, local labour markets 
and patterns of employer demand, geographic factors, community needs and the 
nature of learners and their journey to study patterns (see Spours et al.., 2007 for 
a  more  detailed  discussion).   This  notion  of  ecologies  has  affinities  to  the 
Transforming Learning Cultures project’s use of the term ‘cultures’, and we share 
the view that  ‘teaching and learning cannot be decontextualised from broader  
social,  economic  historical  and  political  forces,  and  that  addressing  this  
complexity directly is the most likely route to understanding that is useful to policy  
and practice’ (Hodkinson and James, 2003:393).   
• Thirdly,  there  are  the  interactions  that  occur  at  the  institutional  level  and  at  
various levels within institutions.  For example, the processes whereby a national 
policy initiative is ‘translated’ into a college policy, which is in turn re-translated by 
middle managers into departmental policies, which are further re-interpreted and 
then acted upon by teachers in classroom practices.  The accumulation of these 
acts of translation and the interaction of these with other factors gives rise to 
what we term ‘policy mediation’.
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• Finally,  there are the  interactions that occur between policy levers.   Individual 
policy levers rarely operate in isolation but usually combine with other levers in 
ways which may not be easy to predict, even by those who construct the levers.  
Each of these types of  interactions lead to policy being mediated in particular  ways, 
giving rise to the possibility that the way in which a policy lever was intended to operate 
becomes distorted or even lost in the processes of its translation.  This leaves room for a 
range of responses by the professionals charged with implementing government policy 
and may lead to unintended consequences or perverse outcomes of policy.  
Configurations of policy levers in the LSS: 3 phases from the 1990s to the present
In this section we will characterise the recent history of the post-compulsory sector in 
England, from the 1990s to the present, as having moved through three distinct phases 
each distinguished by particular configurations of policy levers.               
Mixed models and a dominant lever: the role of funding during the 1990s
During the 1990s England had a ‘mixed’ post-compulsory education and training system 
(Raffe,  1992),  in  which there was  neither  a  dominant  form of  ‘delivery’  (Spours and 
Lucas, 1996) nor a single mode of governance.  Following the 1988 Education Reform 
Act and the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act, this sector of education was divided 
into  three main  parts:  the  newly  incorporated  Further  Education  (FE)  college  sector 
funded  by  the  Further  Education  Funding  Council  (FEFC);  government  training 
programmes and the wider work-based learning sector under the auspices of the local 
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs); and ‘non-vocational’ adult leisure courses and 
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community  learning  provision  funded  by  the  Local  Education  Authorities  (LEAs) 
(Hamilton and Hillier, 2006).  
The establishment of the TECs during 1990-91 and the FEFC in 1992 embodied the 
New  Public  Management  agenda  of  improving  efficiency  and  effectiveness  through 
semi-private  delivery  arrangements  and  the  promotion  of  an  education  and  training 
market.  Incorporated FE colleges under the FEFC and work-based training providers 
under the TECs were steered primarily by funding.   The FEFC funding methodology 
sought to standardise rates of funding between colleges, which had previously received 
widely varying rates through the LEAs.  FEFC funding was based upon the principle of 
resourcing specified units of activity and this approach was used to drive down unit costs 
and expand learner numbers in FE.  This funding unit mechanism enabled the FEFC to 
encourage  colleges  to  pay  more  attention  to  induction,  tutorial  support  and  action 
planning with students; and to promote the provision of more courses which met national 
learning targets (Leney  et al.,1998).  However, the drawbacks of this funding system 
were  that  some  colleges  engaged  in  ‘unit  farming’  (entering  students  for  extra 
qualifications  within  a  single  course,  thereby increasing  the number  of  funding units 
without having to increase student numbers) and ‘unit maximisation’ (focussing on those 
students who would attract the greatest number of funding units).  
The TEC funding system, in contrast to that of the FEFC, allowed considerable local 
discretion (see Coffield, 1992 for a critique) and variability in the rates that TECs paid 
providers for delivering work-based training (Ramsden  et al,  2004).  The TECs used 
output-related funding which aimed to sharpen providers’ focus on achievement and to 
encourage them to deliver outcomes more cost effectively.  However, a problem with this 
approach was that it could lead to a greater focus on short-term labour market needs 
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rather  than  the  longer-term  skills  required  by  individuals  or  the  local  economy. 
Moreover, output-related funding carried the risk that ‘there is great pressure on training  
providers  to  cut  corners  and  even  manufacture outcomes  (qualifications  or  jobs)’ 
(Felstead and Unwin, 2001:103 – emphasis added).  
Under the FEFC and TECs other policy levers were not harnessed to anything like the 
same extent as funding:
• The  use  of  planning  to  meet  learner,  employer  and  community  needs,  was 
largely absent.  The TEC system in particular was criticised for its lack of area-
based and sectoral planning (Coffield, 1992; Vickerstaff, 1998);
• Targets were used differently  in  each sector  -  FE colleges  were set  national 
growth targets for achieving a rapid expansion of student numbers, whereas the 
TECs were subject to performance targets that were set regionally – but they 
were not a major focus for colleges and other training providers;
• The  major  policy  initiatives  were  Youth  Training,  Modern  Apprenticeships, 
National Traineeships, Training for Work and the New Deal, which were mainly 
focussed on offering young people and adults avenues into employment.  Each 
of these was a substantial national programme with its own history, successes 
and failures;
• Responsibility  for  inspection was divided between the FEFC and the Training 
Standards Council.  Despite its many positive features, a significant weakness of 
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the FEFC’s approach to inspection was the absence of effective mechanisms to 
support improvements following inspection (Spours and Lucas, 1996), while the 
TEC-funded sector was dogged by concerns over the quality of provision and the 
weakness of mechanisms for improvement.  
Multiple levers and the rise of planning in the new Learning and Skills Sector  
(2001-2003)
The election of the New Labour government in the UK in 1997 signalled the start of a 
new era for the post-compulsory education and training sector.  Under-funding and an 
over-reliance  on  market  forces  were  replaced  by  a  new focus  on  lifelong  learning, 
widening  participation  and  improving  quality  and  standards  (McDonald  and  Lucas, 
2001).  Following publication of the White Paper Learning to Succeed (DfEE, 1999), the 
Learning and Skills Council (LSC), together with the new Adult Learning Inspectorate 
(ALI), were brought into being by the Learning and Skills Act (Great Britain, 2000).  
The establishment of the LSC and its 47 local offices in April 2001 represented not just a 
new governance structure for the English post-compulsory sector, but also an attempt to 
create for the first time a single Learning and Skills Sector.  The newly formed LSC lay 
between  the  bureaucratic  planning  model  of  the  Keynesian  era  and  the marketised 
paradigm of New Public Management.  It promoted both planning and markets and used 
a range of policy levers rather than relying upon funding as the primary policy steering 
mechanism.   Previously  disconnected  policy  levers  were  to  be  integrated  within  a 
planning framework to ensure that provision in the LSS became more responsive to local 
needs.  In setting out the mission for the new organisation, the Secretary of State for 
Education stressed the need to bring the functions of planning, funding and inspection 
closer together:
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The planning and funding system must respond to the customers of education  
and training.  It must be driven by need, not by central design or existing routes,  
and it must promote equality of opportunity for all to learn and acquire recognised  
skills  and  qualifications.   Plans  should  also  take  account  of  feedback  from 
individual  learners,  findings  from  area  inspections,  and  provider  inspection  
reports about standards of provision.  (Blunkett, 2000: para. 19)              
This more integrated approach was intended to allow the LSC to provide more strategic 
planning of provision at the local level than had hitherto existed.  However in reality, to 
paraphrase one of our interviewees from a local LSC (LLSC) office, during the first two 
years of operation it proved very difficult for the LLSCs to flex their ‘strategic muscles’ in 
the ways that had been hoped.         
During the development  phase of  the LSC,  from 2001 to 2003,  LLSC planning was 
based upon three main processes: reviews of individual providers’ performance, three-
year  planning  agreements  provided  by  providers  and local  area  reviews.   From the 
outset there was a system of Provider Performance Review, through which LLSC staff 
monitored  and  assessed  performance  in  relation  to  ‘participation  and  recruitment’, 
‘learners’  experience  and  performance’  and  ’management’.   Judgements  about 
performance were  informed by  providers’  own Self-Assessment  Reports,  inspections 
reports, data returns and quality monitoring visits by LLSC staff.  It  was not until  the 
publication of  Success for All (DfES, 2002), however, that LLSCs were given a wider 
range of planning tools with which to plan provision on an area basis and to integrate 
further the different policy levers at their disposal.
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Success for All recognised that the inherited ‘system of annual funding agreements has 
led to short-term planning horizons for providers, greatly restricting their ability to take  
longer-term investment  decisions  because  of  uncertainty  about  future  income  flows’  
(DfES, 2002:40), and promised three-year funding arrangements.  In return for greater 
stability (which in fact did not materialise because funding has continued to be allocated 
on an annual basis), funding was to be linked to performance management and a new 
set  of  targets.   Providers  were  required to produce Three-Year  Development  Plans, 
which included a set of improvement targets, to be agreed with the LLSC.  If providers 
agreed  a  Plan,  and  made progress  towards  delivering  the  targets  in  it,  they  would 
receive a higher unit rate of funding, with the possibility of earning a premium rate for  
significantly  exceeding  the  targets.   Correspondingly,  persistent  unsatisfactory 
performance would trigger a lower rate of funding, with intervention and support offered 
by  the LLSC to  aid  improvement.   Performance assessments  formed  ‘the  basis  for  
determining whether or not to enter into three-year funding agreements with colleges  
and  other  providers  and  for  different  rates  of  funding  linked  to  performance’ (LSC, 
2003:22).  In this way,  planning,  funding,  inspection and targets became much more 
closely integrated.                    
The final component of the early LSC’s approach to planning was the Strategic Area 
Review (StAR) of  provision within  each area.   The StAR process involved extensive 
consultation with local partners and was intended to  ‘ensure provision is well planned  
and will aim to build upon the high standard of existing provision in many parts of the  
post-16 sector.  It  will  also  identify  options  for  improving  weaker  provision and filling  
gaps...  and  consider  new,  radical  and  innovative  options  for  change  ensuring  that  
learners in  each part  of  the country have high quality,  safe and accessible  learning  
opportunities’ (Harwood,  2003).   The reality  of  the  StAR process  proved  somewhat 
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different, as LLSCs soon discovered.  Where the sensitive issue of 16-19 provision was 
concerned,  for  example,  they  had  neither  the  power  nor  the  political  support  to 
reorganise  provision  in  the  radical  and  innovative  ways  the  original  policy  had 
suggested.3  At the same time, questions were being asked about whether LLSC staff, 
many of whom had formerly been contract managers within the TECs, had the capacity 
and  experience  necessary  to  undertake  such  a  comprehensive  planning  task. 
Moreover,  providers  and  even  some  LSC  officials  complained  that  its  planning 
processes and internal management structure were excessively bureaucratic.   These 
problems  were  exacerbated  by  the  tendency  of  the  government  Department  for 
Education and Skills to micro-manage the LSC rather than stand back and allow it to 
operate as a genuinely arms-length agency (Hodgson et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, the early LSC successfully achieved a smooth transition from the FEFC 
and TEC systems and overall levels of funding for the LSS increased substantially during 
this period.  The New Labour government aimed to ameliorate the worst effects of the 
quasi-market  while  maintaining  a  commitment  to  formula  funding  and  allocating 
significant additional funding to the sector.  Real increases in funding are illustrated in 
Table 1  (it  should  be noted that  some of  the increases were the result  of  including 
additional areas of activity e.g. sixth form funding from 2002/03).
INSERT HERE TABLE 1 - LSC Annual Grants
In  an  article  on  school  funding  which  has  strong  parallels  for  the  funding  of  post-
compulsory education, Simkins (2004) has argued that, since taking office, the Labour 
government  increased  the  use  of  ‘direct  funding  tied  to  specific  policy  objectives’ 
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(2004:369).   He highlighted  ‘two apparently  contradictory philosophies…of delegation 
and  determination  ’ (ibid, original emphasis) that had underpinned strategies since 1997. 
Essentially the tension was between ‘central government …specifying required changes  
and in using the powers at its disposal to drive change forward’ and permitting localities 
to deliver quality provision while meeting diverse local needs.  Ramsden  et al. (2004) 
support Simkins’ claims: ‘greater national coherence has been achieved at the expense  
of local flexibility’ (2004:416).  They point out that local discretionary funds are relatively 
small  and tend to  be used for  a  large number  of  small-scale  projects.   Our  earlier  
research (Coffield et al., 2005) found that levels of discretionary funding for local LSCs 
were below what had been originally envisaged and were in fact decreasing.
During this period the LSC sought  to align targets with planning,  funding and quality 
improvement mechanisms.   In  1998,  the government offered a definition  of  effective 
targets, which were to form the heart of the Public Service Agreements (PSAs) between 
the  Treasury  and  departments.   Effective  targets  were  to  be  'SMART  –  specific,  
measurable, achievable, relevant and timed’ (HMT, 1998.  See also LSC, 2002).  LSC-
funded providers were initially  set  four ‘headline  targets’  related to learner  numbers, 
employer engagement, success rates and the proportion of teachers and lecturers with 
professional  qualifications.   In  addition,  the  LSC  subsequently  set  ‘floor  targets’  for 
providers, setting out minimum levels of acceptable performance (LSC, 2003).  At the 
national level, the proliferation of PSA targets, to more than 700, highlighted the growing 
problem  of  a  culture  of  measurement.   The  attention  of  many  professionals  was 
increasingly concentrated on meeting the targets rather than improving the quality of the 
services,  resulting  in  targets  becoming  a  threat  to  the  very  standards  they  were 
introduced to raise.  Targets, it became clear, could bring unintended, and often quite 
perverse,  consequences and distortions.   The top-down nature of  many targets also 
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caused difficulties,  as,  admitted by  a  former  Secretary of  State  for  Education:  “The 
biggest problem at the moment is that the profession feels no ownership of the targets,  
none whatsoever” (Estelle Morris quoted in House of Commons, PASC, 2003:14).  
Another  major  theme of  the Labour  government’s  approach to the LSS has been a 
continuous  focus  on  the  quality  of  provision,  with  improved  provision  equated  with 
increased levels of participation, retention and achievement of learners (see for example 
DfEE, 1998).  Hence, as Learning to Succeed asserts: ‘We need a major drive to raise  
standards in post-16 provision as we have done in schools’ (DfEE 1999:43).  Inspection 
has been seen as an important lever for driving this improvement in standards.  The role 
of the two inspectorates for the post-16 sector – Ofsted and the newly formed ALI - was 
to ‘evaluate and report on standards achieved by providers, the quality of learning and  
the efficiency with which resources are managed’ (Blunkett 2000: para 64).  Both were 
expected to work within a Common Inspection Framework, first published in 2001, and 
revised in 2005.  
A plethora of other national agencies also had a role in the ‘drive for quality’ in the sector 
-  the  LSC,  the  Learning  and  Skills  Development  Agency  (LSDA),  the  Centre  for 
Excellence in Leadership (CEL), the DfES Post-16 Standards Unit,  the Qualifications 
and Curriculum Authority (QCA) and Lifelong Learning UK (LLUK).  The confusion and 
bureaucracy  experienced  by  providers  as  a  result  of  the  involvement  of  so  many 
agencies with overlapping remits was something that emerged from our research during 
2004  (Hodgson  et  al.,  2005)  and  was  also  publicly  recognised  in  a  speech  by  the 
Education  Secretary  in  June  2004  (Clarke,  2004)  and  in  the  Foster  Report  (2005). 
However, external agencies that form part of ‘the audit explosion’ (Power, 1994) are not 
the only actors with responsibility for quality improvement in the LSS.  Policy documents 
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also pointed to the role for providers themselves in ‘the drive for quality’.  Success for All, 
for  example,  claimed that  the reforms it  proposed would  ‘lead to a new relationship  
between the LSC and providers based on partnership and trust’, seeing change as  ‘a  
shared challenge’ (DfES 2002:13).  
The period of the early LSC coincided with the development of three major initiatives.  In 
the  field  of  adult  literacy  and  numeracy  the  government  unveiled  the  Skills  for  Life  
strategy in 2001, comprising a comprehensive programme of new national standards 
and core curricula, teaching materials, teacher qualifications, new National Tests and a 
national research and development centre.  The strategy had a high profile target  ‘to  
reduce the overall  number of adults who have difficulty with literacy or numeracy by  
750,000 by 2004’ (DfEE, 2001:35).4  For younger learners at this time the government 
was piloting  Education Maintenance Allowances (EMAs),  which paid 16-19 year  olds 
from lower-income families a weekly allowance to support their participation in post-16 
education.  Employer Training Pilots were set up in September 2002, with the aim of 
encouraging employers to invest in skills and qualifications, particularly through support 
for  workers  with  low  skill  levels.  They  tested  ways  to  improve  access  to  training, 
including offering employers part or fully subsidised training and/or paying replacement 
costs for the time spent by their employees on training.  Although Skills for Life, EMAs 
and the Employer Training Pilots were all at an early or piloting stage in the 2001-2003 
period, their introduction was a sign of the government’s commitment to promoting social 
inclusion  through  education  and  training  and  these  initiatives  reflected  a  spirit  of 
innovation, optimism and expanded opportunities in the new LSS.   
While the period of the early LSC was a period of growth and new opportunities, the 
LSC’s  planning-based approach was criticised for  its  tendency towards  bureaucracy, 
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micro-management and its appetite for data.  A crucial problem for the early LSC was 
that  it  could  not  coherently  configure  major  policy levers because it  was  denied the 
political support necessary to reorganise post-16 provision and, as such, it did not have 
all  of  the  ‘tools  for  the  job’  and  could  not  deliver  quickly  enough  for  a  government 
impatient for quick results (Coffield et al.. 2005). 
National  priorities and market-led improvement under the LSC business model  
(2004 - )  
Following the appointment of  Mark Haysom as the LSC’s second Chief  Executive in 
October  2003  a  new structure  for  the  organisation  was  announced,  leading  to  the 
introduction of a regional management tier and an overall reduction in staff of between 
30-40 percent.   The whole  thrust  of  the reorganisation was to make the LSC  ‘more 
streamlined,  manageable  and  responsive’ (LSC,  2004).   In  the  re-shaped  LSC  the 
balance shifted towards a more overt business model in which a particular concept of 
planning was allied to notions of choice, competition and ‘contestability’.5  Described as a 
streamlined ‘business model’  (LSC, 2005a), the LSC approach to planning within the 
business cycle was elaborated in  Planning for Success (LSC, 2005b), comprising the 
following principles and features:
• a ‘clear line of sight’ between national PSA targets, plans and funding to provide 
the LSC with its priorities; 
• national priorities translated into local targets/local priorities; 
• based on the concept of trust;
• strategic analysis within an area to identify gaps and weak provision;
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• sharing data on provision to identify new markets and the use of persuasion and 
influence rather than direction (Gardner, 2005); 
• a ‘transactional’ relationship with institutional development plans; 
• a focus on institutional improvement and self-assessment within the rhetoric of a 
‘light touch’ approach;
• collaboration  with  the  inspectorate  to  exercise  a  range  of  sanctions  and 
improvement strategies;
• an emphasis on bringing in new providers to break local provision monopolies if 
they proved to be ineffective.
The LSC’s business cycle was designed to provide a clearer and more differentiated 
approach to planning, intended to ‘be simple and transparent, yet sophisticated enough  
to reflect properly the unique contribution made by each provider in meeting the learning  
and skills needs of its local community’ (LSC, 2005b:1).  There was a shift away from the 
earlier emphasis on planning, in favour of a more transactional view of the LSC’s role as 
being to 'only purchase provision which is of good quality and responsive to needs and  
priorities' (LSC,  2005b:3).   This  movement away from planning and towards  a more 
‘demand-led’ approach was given added impetus by the Leitch Review (Leitch, 2006), 
which recommended that  ‘all  publicly funded, adult  vocational skills in England, apart  
from community learning, [should] go through demand-led routes by 2010’, via the new 
National Employer Training Programme (Train to Gain) and new Learner Accounts.  As a 
result of ‘contestability’ and a renewed emphasis on the responsibility of institutions for 
their own self-improvement, the business model can be seen as representing a more 
market-led approach to planning and improvement.  However, it is perhaps best seen as 
an  adjusted  market  model because  it  is  also  strongly  politically  driven  to  deliver 
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government  PSA  targets, with  the  LSC  having  to  reconcile  the  imperative  to  meet 
national priorities with the need for  'local dialogue about how best those priorities and  
targets are delivered in each locality' (LSC, 2005b:3).  
As  a  result  of  expanding  numbers  of  16-19  year  olds  and  adults  participating  in 
education and training6  and rising costs in some areas, funding in the LSS has begun to 
tighten.   In  line  with  the  principles  of  the  LSC business  model  outlined  above,  the 
response to these funding pressures has been a greater focus on the government’s 
national priorities.  The main priority areas for 2006/07 and 2007/08 are reforms of the 
14-19 phase to improve Level 2 attainments by the age of 19; to offer all adults a free 
entitlement to improve their Basic Skills and to achieve their first Level 2 qualification; 
and to expand employer engagement through the Train to Gain initiative.  To achieve its 
targets in these priority areas, the government and the LSC have increasingly talked 
about maximising provider income raised through learner and employer fees in other 
areas of learning (LSC, 2005c).  One of the dangers of the current emphasis on the 
national priority areas is that it runs the risk of excluding some of the very groups it is 
targeting.   For  example,  there  is  a  danger  in  emphasising  targets  for  attainment  at 
Levels  1  and  2  so  strongly  that  providers  will  concentrate  on  these  courses at  the 
expense of adults whose need is for Entry Level courses (NIACE, 2005).  Hodgson et al. 
(2007) discuss the impact  of cuts in  Adult  and Community Learning on provision for 
Basic Skills learners.  
The period since 2004 has been one in which the three major initiatives we are looking 
at became firmly established and two of them,  Skills for Life  and  Train to Gain,  now 
feature as headline government priorities for the sector.  EMAs have also become an 
important  part  of  the 16-19 landscape and the LSC is  currently developing an Adult 
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Learning  Grant  for  disadvantaged  adult  learners  undertaking  full-time courses  in  FE 
(DfES, 2006).             
The  government’s  response  to  the  confusion  that  previously  existed  around 
responsibilities for inspection and quality improvement was rationalisation. Ofsted and 
ALI are to merge into a unified inspectorate and a single Quality Improvement Agency 
for  Lifelong  Learning (QIA)  has been established,  to  ‘lead and co-coordinate a  new 
strategy for quality improvement in the sector aiming to achieve excellence in learning  
and skills provision’ and ‘work closely with the key national agencies with responsibilities  
for  quality  assessment,  assurance  and  improvement  to  ensure  a  single,  integrated  
approach across the whole sector’ (QIA, 2006:6).7 
In the White Paper,  Further Education: Raising Skills,  Improving Life Chances (DfES, 
2006), the onus for improvement and consequent growth and success of the sector is 
placed squarely on the shoulders of providers.  The rhetoric is of a move from inspection 
and  compliance  to  self-assessment  and  excellence;  the  tone  of  the  White  Paper  is 
impatient, assuming success and predicting the elimination of failure (p.56):  
Each college  or  provider  will  see quality  as the core of  its  business  and be  
constantly  striving  for  improvement.   As  a  result,  the  system  will  have  a  
reputation for high and rising standards.  Young people and adults will want to  
participate, because they will be confident that their learning and qualifications  
will  help them to achieve their  own goals  and ambitions.   Employers  will  be  
impressed by the commitment to quality of service, and be able to find education  
and training that adds real value to their business.  (DfES 2006:17-18)
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The prize  for  those providers  achieving  these aspirations  set  by the Government  is 
‘lighter touch’ accountability with the possibility of fewer inspections, longer-term funding, 
the  ‘freedom  to  develop  and  innovate’ and  to  ‘spread  their  excellent  practice  more 
widely’ (p. 60).  The penalties for those ‘failing’ or even ‘coasting’, however, are severe, 
ranging from formal notification of the need to improve, through funding restrictions to a 
change of leadership and/or governance, cessation of funding and merger. 
The consultation document  Framework for Excellence: A Comprehensive Performance  
Assessment Framework for the Further Education System (LSC, 2006) sets out in more 
detail the LSC’s approach to promoting excellence in the sector, promising a clearer and 
less bureaucratic system of accountability.   The aim of the Framework is to  ‘provide 
readily  understood  measures  of  performance  that  can  be  used  publicly  to  promote  
excellence  and  the  reputation  of  the  sector’  within  a  ‘comprehensive  yet  simple 
framework’ (LSC, 2006:3).  Closely correlated with the Common Inspection Framework, 
the Framework  for  Excellence  is  founded upon a  ‘scorecard’  of  7  Key Performance 
Indicators  (KPIs)  which  describe  three  key  dimensions  of  provider  performance 
(responsiveness, effectiveness of provision and finance) 8.  On the basis of the 7 KPIs 
each provider will receive a single overall performance rating and the following ambitious 
claim was made for this new system of performance measures:           
                   
With excellence and the route to it clearly defined, managers and governors will  
be able to form a clearer understanding of what they need to do to secure a good 
or excellent rating. The aim is to create demanding standards that will help the  
best colleges and providers maintain and enhance their excellent record, enable  
those that are good to reach the standards of the best, and provide a tool that will  
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make clear to those that are average or not improving what they must do to raise  
their levels of performance (LSC, 2006:6)
It is also claimed the Framework for Excellence will help employers and learners to make 
more informed choices, allow comparisons of performance and value for money across 
the LSS, reduce bureaucracy and assist the movement towards greater self-regulation – 
all  of  which  closely  mirror  the  priorities  of  the  LSC’s  business  model  previously 
mentioned.
The movement of planning within the LSS back towards a more marketised approach 
reveals  both  its  strengths  and weaknesses.   Its  strength  lies  in  the way  in  which  it 
assembles  a  coherent  discourse  around  funding  priorities,  inspection,  institutional 
flexibility and self-improvement.  However, the LSC business model can also be seen as 
being more politicised because it is strongly driven by top-down targets and the priorities 
set by national government, resulting in a less secure planning environment for providers 
and leaving large swathes of adult provision in a precarious funding position.  It is also a 
partial strategy because it does not seek to integrate partners in an equitable way.  The 
model  makes  recourse  to  exhortation  with  employers  (Hayward  et  al.,  2005);  has 
negotiated a less intrusive approach with FE colleges,  but cannot really engage with 
schools  on  14-19  education  and  training  because  the  leading  role  lies  with  local 
authorities (DfES, 2006).  It is variously punitive and inclusive towards training providers. 
Above  all,  the  business  model  displays  weak  area  planning  functions  (Perry  and 
Simpson, 2006; Hodgson and Spours 2006); something which the early LSC at least 
attempted to address, albeit bureaucratically. 
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Professional responses to policy levers 
Professionals working within the LSS do not normally respond to isolated policy levers 
but tend to act on the basis of their combined effects.  Moreover, policy levers are just  
one of a wide range of factors influencing their practice – the broader policy framework, 
staff professionalism and values, the needs and characteristics of the learners, the ethos 
and  policies  of  the  learning  institution,  the  curriculum  and  pedagogy,  management 
cultures,  employer  involvement  and  the  physical  learning  environment  all  play  an 
important role.  Thus, any analysis of the impact of policy must look at the particular 
configuration of policy levers within the wider political context, at the interactions of policy 
levers with local ecologies and at their mediation within institutions.
Our research with 24 sites of learning in London and the North East suggests that the 
effects of  policy levers are mediated at  different  institutional  levels  and that  learning 
managers and tutors often proactively  adopt  particular  stances in  response to these 
external levers.  In other words, the engineering metaphor of a policy ‘lever’ does not 
hold at the level of practice because there is little evidence of practitioners mechanically 
responding to these levers  in  simple  and predictable  ways.   We have come across 
examples  of  ‘translation'  where  institutions  formulate  policies  that  can have  a  major 
bearing on the way in which national  policy is understood and implemented.   These 
institutional level policies can either ameliorate or exacerbate the impact of policy levers 
for those working within the institution.  It is also clear that the management style of 
institutional  and  departmental  leaders,  linked  to  the  particular  features  of  the 
'communities of  practice'  (Lave and Wenger, 1991) they build,  can mediate policy in 
important ways.  As part of this, some managers may 'shield' their staff from the worst 
excesses  of  bureaucracy or  hide their  concerns about  the  possible  effects  of  policy 
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levers.  Others may become advocates for policy and seek to impress upon their staff 
the importance of national priorities, targets and so on.  An alternative, more nuanced, 
response has been where  staff  ‘strategically’  and even 'ingeniously'  comply with  the 
demands of external policy levers, whilst  acting in accord with their own professional 
values and judgement (Shain and Gleeson, 1999).  This type of response may include 
forms of gaming, e.g. seeking to achieve targets quickly for ‘priority’ group A in order to 
then focus resources on ‘non-priority’  group B.  Another more radical response is for 
staff at all levels to exit, i.e. to leave the profession altogether, in response to levels of 
stress that have become intolerable for them.9           
Our account of the three different phases since 1990 highlights an evolution in which, 
regardless of the particular balance between planning and markets at any given time, 
policy  appears  to  be being  steered with  ever  more precision  and increasing  central 
control.   As  Newman  argues,  this  development  can  occur  alongside  the  growing 
emphasis on ‘light touch’ regulation because public service professionals are subject to a 
range of incentives and sanctions which promote professional  self-regulation  (which is 
very much in evidence in the Framework for Excellence and other features of the LSC 
business model):    
Under Labour, there has been an intensification of external controls (standards,  
targets,  audit  and  inspection),  coupled  with  the  emphasis  on  distinguishing  
between successful  and  failing  organisations.   But  each  has  the  capacity  to  
produce a self-regulatory effect…  The installation of a ‘calculative technology’  
does not, however, necessarily induce commitment to the government’s goals,  
nor motivate public service staff to work in new ways.  (Newman, 2001:95)  
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Tighter  policy  steering  and  increased  central  control  over  the  activities  of  front-line 
professionals does not guarantee that they will commit to the government’s reforms and 
runs the risk of alienating them, even when they support the broad policy objectives. 
Policy  steering  may  therefore  be  more  effective  when  professionals  are  afforded 
meaningful  opportunities  to  have  an  input  into  the  way  in  which  policy  levers  are 
implemented,  so  that  they  inform  as  well  as  deliver  government  policy.   A  recent 
discussion paper on the UK government’s approach to public service reform (PMSU, 
2006) presents a model in which the four main components of a ‘self-improving system’ 
to generate ‘better public service for all’ are: top-down performance management (e.g. 
outcome targets, regulation and standard setting, performance assessment/inspection 
and direct intervention); market incentives to increase efficiency and quality of service; 
users  shaping  the  service  from below;  and  capability  and  capacity  (e.g.  leadership, 
workforce  development  and  organisational  development/collaboration).   This  model 
appears to present professionals as  objects of reform (e.g. through their subjection to 
training,  monitoring  and  inspection)  but  not  as  active  partners who  have  much  to 
contribute to the improvement of public services.  It also ignores questions about how 
those working within public services reconcile the tensions within this approach, such as 
that  between  meeting  national  targets  and  responding  to  user  needs,  or  between 
markets and planning.                                                       
Is there, then, the potential for another model of planning to emerge within a new system 
of governance?  We would argue, based upon our data, that such a model would have 
to possess a strong public ethos; be professionally democratic rather than bureaucratic 
and hierarchical; and be able to connect social partners at a local area and not just at an 
institutional  level.   In the next  phase of  our work  we will  be developing these ideas 
further as we use our data from interviews at all levels of the LSS to set out the key 
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features of an ‘effective and inclusive learning system’,  making recommendations for 
how policy in the sector might be improved.
 Notes    
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